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RECONSIDERATION OF SUBROGATIVE RIGHTS OF THE
MILLER ACT PAYMENT BOND SURETY
THE owner in private construction contracts, in order to secure timely per-
formance from the contractor and to protect the improvement from the liens
of unpaid laborers and materialmen,' usually contracts for retention of a per-
centage of progress payments. This retained fund, known as retainages, be-
comes due and payable to the contractor upon acceptance of performance and
release of all claims. 2 Combined or separate performance and payment bonds, 3
required by law in some states 4 and customary on larger projects elsewhere,,
provides an additional means of protection for the owner and suppliers. Since
satisfactory performance and payment of laborers and materialmen is a con-
dition precedent to disbursement of the fund, the owner upon default by the
contractor may expend the retainages to satisfy the claims of suppliers or to
complete performance.6 Where a payment bond is required, the surety, if
1. Mechanics' lien laws, designed to secure payment of suppliers by providing a lien on
the structure to which they have contributed superior to the claims of the contractor's
creditors, have been enacted in all states. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138 (1958). See also
United States v. Holman Lumber Co., 206 F.2d 685, 690, reaff'd on rehearing, 208 F.2d
113 (5th Cir. 1953) ; In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 1948) ;
United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. 1953) ; MAcLACH-
LAN, BANKRUPTCY 234 (1956) ; CUSHMAN, CREDIT FACTORS IN CoNSTRUcTIoN 1 (1951) ;
Kerrigan, The Surety As Competing Claimant to Contract Funds, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 34,
35 (1957).
2. See GEE, AGENT'S BONDING GUIDE 150-51 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as GEE];
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AUDITING IN THE CONSTRUC-
TION INDUSTRY 15 (1959). Often, the sum will not be released until the period for filing
liens against the improvement has lapsed. The contractor, however, may request premature
release of the withheld moneys; but when the contract is bonded, the consent of the surety
is usually required. See GEE 150-51.
3. Combined coverage is available at no additional expense. SURETY ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, BONDS OF SURETYSHIP 20-21 (1959) ; GEE 138; MACKALL, PRINCIPLES OF SURE-
TY UNDERWRITING 123 (1951) [hereinafter cited as MACKALL]. See AIA approved stand-
ard form, Doc. No. A-311, Performance and Payment Bonds (1958 ed.) (separate bonds)
set forth at SURETY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, op. cit. supra at 32-39; Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company standard combined performance and payment bond, form S-1713-B.
4. E.g., LA. Rxv. STAT. tit. 38, § 2241 (1951). See CUSHMAN, BONDS ON PUBLIC
WORKS 600 (1960), reprinted from CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS (1960 ed.)
ToMSON, IT'S THE LAW! 110-11 n.2 (1960).
5. The existence of mechanics' lien laws, effectively transforming the owner's prop-
erty into a "real surety," created a need for surety bond protection in private construction.
See SURETY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7-9, 19-24; CUSHMAN, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 3, 9-16; TEXAS AGC CHAPTERS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, So YOU WANT
To BE A SUCCESSFUL CONTRACTOR 8-13 (1957).
6. Cf. Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y.
159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934) ; Stanton v. Babor-Comeau & Co., 168 Misc. 190, 6 N.Y.S.2d
231 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 831, 22 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1940). See Annot., 107
A.L.R. 960 (1937).
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called upon, may satisfy the twofold obligations of the defaulting contractor:
to provide the owner with an unencumbered structure and to meet the legiti-
mate claims of suppliers. If such contractor is bankrupt, the retainages held by
the owner constitute the surety's major source of salvage 7 and may be reached
through subrogation.8 Under traditional principles of subrogation, where a per-
son not as a volunteer and in the absence of outstanding superior equities pays
a debt of another, that person is substituted to all rights and remedies of the
creditor as if the debt had never been paid.9 Because the owner, having the
right to protect himself from the consequences of default, may apply the fund
to unpaid claims, the surety is subrogated to this right in the fund.10 Title to
7. Salvage, a trade term, encompasses the various forms of recovery-reimbursement,
exoneration, subrogation, assignment, self-help, and indemnity-used to offset losses under
the bond. Its importance cannot be underestimated, for without it surety rates would be
substantially higher. BACKIIAN, SuRTy RATE-MAKING 34-35, 90-91 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as BACKMrAN] ; CRIST, CORPORATE SURETYSHIP 122-23 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
CRIsT].
Under general principles of suretyship, the contractor-principal impliedly contracts to
exonerate his surety by fulfillment of the obligations of the contract. See Finkelstein v.
Keith Fabrics, Inc., 278 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Biggs, 217
F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1940) ;
Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 632
(1939); Danais v. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (D.N.H. 1952). See Howell,
Exoneration of Surety, 22 INs. COUNSEL J. 49 (1955) ; Smedley, TIdemnification Before
Payment-A New Remedy For the Surety?, 40 Ky. L.J. 167 (1951).
In the absence of exoneration, the surety is owed reimbursement to the extent of loss
by the contractor. American Sur. Co. v. Haynes, 91 Fed. 90 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1898) ; Finkel-
stein v. Keith Fabrics, Inc., supra. See Witherspoon, Surety's Salvage and Subrogation,
25 INs. COUNSEL J. 168 (1958) ; Miller & Ireton, Problem of Surety in Completing Con-
tract Over Protest of Principal, 22 INs. COUNSEL J. 472, 473 (1955) ; Smedley, supra at
167; MACKALL 15.
But, if the defaulting contractor is insolvent or in bankruptcy, as is often the case,
exoneration and reimbursement will be inadequate remedies. See Mansfield & McCahan,
Claims Under Contract Bonds, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 265, 266-71 (1954).
8. Upon satisfaction of the contractor-principal's debt, the surety may be subrogated
to the position of: The creditor whom he pays. E.g., Munsey Trust Co. v. United States,
67 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Cl. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 234 (1947) ; see Sin-
SON, SURETYSHIP 205-23 (1950). The owner. See notes 9-10 infra and accompanying text.
And the defaulting contractor. See Cooney, Practical Problems Facing Surety on Bond of
a Defaulting Public Contractor, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 145 (1954); Haas, The Corporate
Surety ad Public Construction Bonds, 25 GEo. WAsn. L. REv. 206, 211 (1957) ; but see
Kerrigan, supra note 1, at 36.
Additionally, the surety may assert rights under the indemnity agreement and assign-
ment universally present in the bond application. See Cooney, supra at 145; Haas, supra
at 220; MACKALL 16.
9. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Conn. 232, 238, 193 Atl.
769, 772 (1937).
10. See note 6 supra. The retainage is subject to forfeiture for nonpayment of sup-
pliers, as well as under default in performance, because the payment is an implied obliga-
tion of the contractor under the contract and both bonds, even where the primary contract
is silent as to the duty of the contractor to pay suppliers. Cf. In re Scofield Co., 215 Fed.
45 (2d Cir. 1914).
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the fund never passing from the owner, the surety, as his subrogee, has a
superior claim to all other claimants," including the contractor's trustee in
bankruptcy.
12
The subrogative salvage rights of a surety suffering loss under public con-
struction contracts, however, are not so clear. Because the Government has no
direct contractual obligation to pay laborers and materialmen, 13 and since its
structures are immune from lien,14 it, unlike the private owner, need be direct-
ly concerned only with damages arising out of default in performance which
are adequately covered by the performance bond.15 Though the Government
11. The surety's claim is superior to that of banks asserting rights under assignments
obtained from the contractor upon loan of moneys. See, e.g., Lacy v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32
F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1929) ; In re Zaepfel & Russell, 49 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd
sub. nor. Farmer's State Bank v. Jones, 135 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1943) (per curiam) ;
Moran v. Guardian Cas. Co., 76 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934). See Note,
30 IowA L. REv. 568, 572-73 (1945); Kerrigan, supra note 1, at 36-37, 39; Cooney,
supra note 8, at 147-48; SImPsoN, SuRETYsH P 211-12 (1950) ; but see River Junction v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 133 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1943), criticized in Note, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 174
(1943).
The surety's rights are also superior to those of the United States where its lien pre-
dates the attaching of the federal claim. E.g., Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Martin Infante
Co., 272 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Housing Authority, 241 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1957); American Sur. Co. v. Municipal Housing Comm'n, 63 F. Supp. 486
(W.D. Ky. 1945), aff'd sub. norn. Glenn v. American Sur. Co., 160 F.2d 977 (6th Cir.
1947); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 4 N.Y.2d 639, 152 N.E.2d 225 (1958).
See Kerrigan, supra note 1, at 42-46. Compare United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355
U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam), where a surety unsuccessfully claimed the contract fund
as against federal tax liens because of a loss the surety sustained on another contract.
12. E.g., Danais v. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (1952) (subcontractor's
trustee against prime contractor on federal job). See Comment, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 541
(1955); Note, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 712 (1956); Haas, supra note 8, at 221. But see
Shapiro v. Royal Indem. Co., 224 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1955).
13. See the federal construction contract, Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App.,
Rules & Regs. § 54.13 (1958) and the new Standard Form No. 23A, effective July 1, 1961,
26 Fed. Reg. 1050-51 (1961); United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241
(1957) ; Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955) ; National Sur. Corp.
v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
14. Equitable Sur. Co. v. McMillan, 234 U.S. 448, 455 (1914); United States v. An-
sonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910) ; Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197,
203 (1906) ; Armstrong v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; National Sur.
Corp. v. United States, supra note 13.
15. The surety may pursue two courses of action upon the contractor's default in per-
formance. It may waive its right of completion and, liable solely under the bond, limit its
possible loss to costs of completion up to the penal sum of the bond. See, e.g., Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 97 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Board of Education v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 27 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See also MACKALL 12. Since the
Government advertises for bids and relets the completion contract to the lowest bidder,
the surety will not have to assume the burden of maintaining the defaulting contractor's
organization or managing and supervising the subsequent contractor's operations, the
dangers of being subject to the known and unknown indebtedness of the defaulting contrac-
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had no legal obligation to acknowledge the claims of laborers and materialmen,
Congress was unwilling to leave such claimants with no more than a direct
contractual action against the defaulting contractor, for in the event of the lat-
ter's insolvency they would be deprived of a secured remedy.16 The Heard
Act 17 was thus passed to afford laborers and materialmen more adequate pro-
tection.' s Its successor, the Miller Act,19 presently requires as a condition of
award of a public contract, besides the execution of a performance bond, a
separate payment bond which provides for prompt payment of all persons sup-
plying labor and material on federal construction projects.20 Thus, as in the
tor, and, most importantly, the risk of opening itself to unlimited liability in excess of the
face amount of the bond. See Mansfield & McCahan, supra note 7, at 267-70.
Or the surety may elect to complete the contract, providing in its "take-over" contract
with the United States for payment of the retainages upon completion. See 31 DEcs. Comp.
GEN. 103 (1951). Since the surety's liability is no longer measured by the penal sum of
the bond, but, rather, according to the terms of the "take-over" contract, it assumes total
liability for all costs of completion. See, e.g., Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. E. E. Cloer
Gen'l Contractor, Inc., 217 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1954). It will therefore consider its choice
carefully. See Mansfield & McCahan, supra note 7, at 266-72.
Often the surety will attempt to conceal its role as the performing force in completion
of the contract in order to avoid the usual increase in costs exacted, from the "fat cat."
Purporting to maintain the defaulted contractor's operations without change, it arranges
with the contractor's bank for an "open"f or "no-balance" account to be held in the con-
tractor's name. As expenses are incurred, the superintendent on the job informs the surety
company of their amount and character and, upon approval, draws the required amount
from the "no-balance" account. The bank, having arranged with the surety for a "suspen-
sory" account, charges the approved draft of the superintendent against the latter account,
depositing the amount of the draft in the "no-balance" account. In this manner, not only
is the role of the surety hidden, but the funds disbursed on the contract are not subject to
attachment.
16. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957) ; Belknap Hardware
& Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144 (6th Cir. 1921). See Note, 30 IowA
L. REv. 568, 570 (1945) (similar incentive in state bond enactments).
17. 28 Stat. 278 (1894), as amended, 33 Stat. 811 (1905).
18. The Heard Act, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), as amended, 33 Stat. 811 (1905), required
as a condition of the award of a public contract a single bond securing to the United States
faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment of all persons supplying labor
and material in the prosecution of the work. The unitary bond was in effect two instru-
ments, one securing to the Government the performance of the contractor's obligations
towards it, and the second protecting materialmen and laborers. Equitable Sur. Co. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 448 (1914) ; United States v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,
18 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1927) ; United States v. National Sur. Co., 92 Fed. 549 (8th Cir.
1899). This was superseded in 1935 by passage of the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40
U.S.C. § 270 (1958), amended, 73 Stat. 279 (1959), 40 U.S.C.A. § 270 (1960 Supp.).
Prompted by the same incentive, all states, either by express legislation or as a matter
of policy, now require some form of bond protection for laborers and materialmen. CusH-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 597.
19. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270 (1958), amended, 73 Stat. 279 (1959), 40
U.S.C.A. § 270b (1960 Supp.).
20. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1)-(2) (1958). Though the Heard
and Miller Acts are substantially the same, the two bond system of the latter, in addition
to curing the technical defects of the former's unitary bond, provides instruments of
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private field, when the surety is properly called upon to fulfill the defaulting
contractor's obligations to suppliers, the surety, asserting subrogative rights
through either the creditors paid or the Government, will look to the retain-
ages as its most valuable source of salvage. If the contractor is bankrupt, his
trustee in bankruptcy will oppose this claim. Such trustee will argue that the
laborers and materialmen, being limited to an action upon the payment bond,
have no legally enforceable rights to the retainages against the Government
and thus are mere general creditors. 21 Moreover, the Government has no con-
tractual right to retain or use the fund as security for the payment of claims
arising from labor and material contracts to which it is not privy.2 2 Consequent-
ly, the surety is subrogated to nothing.
Any superiority of claim to the retainages that the trustee in bankruptcy
may assert over the Miller Act payment bond surety must be based on the for-
tuity of the status of the bankrupt as a contractor on public work rather than
on private projects, because the distinctions urged by the trustee are ultimate-
ly founded on the traditional immunity of the Government from liens on its
structures. But the assumption of a need for Government immunity from liens
on withheld funds is only meaningful where the Government has a claim of its
own to set-off; for in that case, the Government possesses an interest which
the immunity serves to protect. Where the Government holds the funds as a
stakeholder, however, the claims of the surety as subrogee are not asserted
against the United States, since the claim in no way subjects the Government
to liability beyond the amount admittedly due and owing to somebody.2 3 Favor-
ing the claims of the trustee in bankruptcy to retainages will in effect constitute
a windfall to general creditors unavailable in the private field.24 It would, fur-
thermore, appear undesirable to create such disparate results between public
and private construction contracts. In both, the surety and suppliers contribute
to the creation of the funds sought by the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit
of general creditors, claimants wholly unconnected with the productive activi-
ties underlying its creation.25 Moreover, if the cost of private and public bonds
is to remain substantially similar, the risks of the surety must be equivalent in
both fields. Since subrogation is a prime element in the salvage procedure ex-
greater flexibility. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2; SURETY AssOCIATIoN OF AMERICA,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 20-21; GEE 136-38.
21. See notes 42-43 .upra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 60-62 infra and accompanying text.
23. National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 384 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 902 (1955). The policy of Government protection is no longer applicable as the
Government stands as a mere formal defendant with no attendant risk of loss. If fearful
of multiple liability, it may readily exercise its rights of interpleader of the interested
parties in any action that arises for payment. See Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 169
F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
24. Recovery of retainages by general creditors is considered a windfall in the private
field. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Grand Ave. State Bank, 223 F.2d 513, 521 (5th Cir. 1955). It
is doubtful that general creditors take into account the substantive technical distinctions
between public and private contracts before extending credit.
25. See In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 441, 443 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
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clusively relied upon by the surety for mitigation of loss,2 6 denying him such
rights must increase the loss and therefore the rate charged for the bond,
which adds to the Government's cost for the prime contract.2 7 Such differen-
tial, moreover, may unduly restrict the underwriting activities of surety com-
panies to the detriment of the capable, but small contractor, 28 which would be
26. See BACKMAN 90-91; Haas, supra note 8, at 212; CRIsT 122-23. Considering the
following loss experience table, the importance of salvage becomes apparent.
Surety Association of America: Fidelity, Surety and Forgery Countrywide Classification:
Association Companies:
Gross Direct Premions Net Losses incl.
UWritten less Cancella- claim & salvage Loss
tions & return premuns expense Ratio
Year 1960-Public & Private Contracts, not
including Federal:
$72,699,357 $54,752,712 75.0%
Year 1960, Federal Contracts:
$12,911,266 $12,195,196 94.5%
Adding to the above loss ratios the ratio of expense of underwriting to earned premiums
-51.8%-the extent of loss, particularly on federal construction work, becomes apparent.
BACKMAN 131. This loss experience seems to transform the surety company into an insur-
ance company, a result directly contrary to the intended end of suretyship. See BACKMAN
130-50; LUNT, SURETY BONDS 5 (1922) [hereinafter cited as LUNIT] ; CRIST 6-11; SURETY
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16-18, 29-31; TEXAS A.G.C. CHAPTERS
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 10.
Theoretically, the surety company takes no risk whatever because the contractor, pre-
sumed to be financially able to assume the risks of construction, is still the primary obligor
under the contract and bond. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1957), cert. dcnicd, 354 U.S. 922, rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1958) ; LUNT
5; CRIsT 7; BACKMAN 34-35, 63. Indeed, the premium exacted is primarily intended as a
service fee for the surety's loan of credit and the costs of underwriting. Unlike insurance,
it is not consideration for the bond, and it is only secondarily retained as a pool for bond
losses. LUNT 6; BACKMAN 34-35, 50; MACKALL 10, 12-13; C~isT 32-35, 172. For a com-
parison of suretyship and banking, see BAcKMAN 204-08.
Yet, many courts persist in regarding a surety bond as a contract of insurance without
regard to the former considerations. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. J. R.
Thompson Co., 88 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 707 (1937) ; Commerce Title
Guar. Co. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Tenn. 1940), aff'd per curiam, 121 F.2d
452 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 657 (1942) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Remer, 167
Minn. 352, 209 N.W. 315 (1926).
27. See In re Dutcher Constr. Co., 197 F. Supp. 441 (1961) ; note 26 supra.
28. The required contract bonds under the Miller Act serve primarily as screening
devices which, by operation of the underwriting process, protect the Government and sup-
pliers from the dangers of relying on irresponsible or incompetent contractors. Haas, supra
note 8, at 207-0; CRisT 27-28, 35; TEXAS A.G.C. CHAPTERS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 10-13. But see, SuRETY Ass ciATioN OF AMIERICA, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 9.
Since underwriting is largely a matter of judgment and the level of acceptable rate and
risk may be determinative of surety success, surety companies scrutinize with great care
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directly contrary to the express governmental policy of encouraging the par-
ticipation of small business in federal construction projects.2 9 These considera-
tions, therefore, demonstrate the need for clearly establishing the subrogative
rights of the Miller Act payment bond surety to retainages withheld under a
public contract. Such rights must depend upon traditional and sound principles
of subrogation that can be comprehended and uniformly applied by the courts.
Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.30 was the earliest judicial
attempt to provide a doctrinal foundation upon which to rest the rights of the
payment bond surety to retainages held by the Government as stakeholder. In
that case, an action by the surety to restrain payment to an assignee bank of
the fund held by the Government subsequent to its contractor's performance,
the Supreme Court held that the surety upon payment to suppliers had not
only released the contractor from his obligations to such suppliers, but had
also, to the same extent, released the Government from all "equitable obliga-
tions" to see that they were paid.3 ' The surety thereby became entitled to
equitable rights in the fund which dated back to the commencement of its
obligation-the date of the bond's execution.32 This statement of the surety's
rights is susceptible of two constructions, both equally questionable under
sound principles of suretyship. Either the Court was saying that the surety,
as in the case of default of its principal (the contractor), has an action for
simple reimbursement against the Government as a secondary principal; or it
was saying that the Government, as equitable obligor, though not legally
bound, may exercise its discretion in order to satisfy an obligation which it, in
equity and good conscience, should satisfy. In either case, the Government,
the factors of good risk-the contractor's experience, ability, familiarity with the kind of
work sought, financial status, cash position, equipment and general history. MACKALL 78;
CRisT 7, 11; LUNT 5. If the level of risk rises in federal contracts, the availability of surety
coverage to the small contractor will necessarily be limited, although it is often the most
solid contractor, not the small or jerry builder who defaults. CUSHMAN, Op. Cit. supra note
1, at 12-13; BACKMAN 30-31.
29. Small business concerns shall be afforded an equitable opportunity to compete for
prime contracts and subcontracts.
41 U.S.C.A. App., Rules & Regs. § 1-1.702(b) (1) (Supp. 1961).
30. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
31. Id. at 410. The Government's equitable obligation stems from the equitable notion
that the Government should not retain the benefits of the work of laborers and material-
men whom the contractor should have paid, while at the same time paying the unrelated
debts of the contractor. National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 384 (Ct.
Cl. 1955). See the statement of the Supreme Court of Missouri in St. Louis Public Schools
v. Woods, 77 Mo. 197, 201-02 (1883) :
I think the law is not inclined to deny the board, even if it is a municipal corpora-
tion, the satisfaction and ease of conscience which the private citizen is naturally
supposed to experience, when he reflects that the structure he dwells in has been
entirely paid for, from the mason who laid the foundation to the artist who frescoed
the ceilings.
32. 208 U.S. at 411, quoting from Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227
(1896) (Heard Act performance bond).
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like the contractor, is afforded surety coverage, and consequently becomes the
"principal" of the surety; it is at the same time, however, unlike the contrac-
tor, the obligee (the beneficiary) of the bond. Traditional concepts of re-
imbursement and of subrogation, moreover, although broad enough to include
every instance in which a surety pays the debt for which another is primarily
liable,33 would not extend to the present case where the Government is merely
an equitable obligor, at most secondarily responsible for expenses of labor and
material incurred under its contracts. Despite these doctrinal difficulties, how-
ever, many courts in subsequent cases have accepted the Henningsen rationale
without comment.
34
But other courts, distressed by the absence of any legal obligation on the
part of the Government to satisfy suppliers' claims, have experienced difficulty
in applying Henningsen.35 Because the Government was fully satisfied upon
completion of performance, such courts conclude that the designation of the
Government as obligee of the payment bond must be merely a formal one pro-
vided for the convenience of claimants; this could not therefore establish a
governmental right to use the retainages to which the surety could be subro-
gated. 36 But a source of the surety's subrogative rights could still be found,
they reasoned, since the "necessary effect" of Henningsen was that, "in spite
of or in addition to the giving of the bond," the laborers and materialmen had
"an original and continuing equitable priority in the fund" which could be
transferred to the surety.37 Some courts characterized this right of suppliers
as an "equitable lien" on the fund.38 However described, courts adopting this
33. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Conn. 232, 237, 193 Atl.
769, 772 (1937) (subrogation). See SIMPSON, SuPRrysHiP 229-30 (1950) (reimburse-
ment).
34. The "equitable right" in Henningsen has been considered synonymous and inter-
changeable with the term "equitable lien." Danais v. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp.
874, 877 (D.N.H. 1952). Courts have also variously termed the obligation of the Govern-
ment a "moral obligation," American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d
377, 379 (5th Cir. 1935), aff'd, 296 U.S. 133 (1935) ; Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v.
Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144 (6th Cir. 1921); or an "equitable obligation,"
California Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Mor-
genthau v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 94 F.2d 632, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1937). On the origin and
development of the doctrine of the "equitable lien" acquired by subrogation to the rights
of the United States, see Note, 20 U. CiNc. L. REv. 494, 499-500 (1951).
35. The source of difficulty was the seeming dependence of Henningsen on Prairie
State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896). In that case, the Supreme Court awarded
the retainages to a Heard Act performance bond surety on the basis of subrogation to the
rights of its obligee, the United States. These courts found it difficult to make the conceptual
plunge from performance bond principles into the payment bond field.
36. E.g., Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144 (6th
Cir. 1921).
37. Id. at 149. See American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 377
(5th Cir.), aff'd, 296 U.S. 133 (1935) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp.
891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
38. E.g., Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937); United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935) ; Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. McKinlay,
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approach hold that the surety has the right, which exists potentially from the
moment of execution of the bond, to be subrogated to these equities,30 a right
which, upon payment following the contractor's default, relates back to the
date of execution of the bond, 0 thus creating secured rights in the fund su-
perior to those of the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy.
41
This subrogative route of the surety .through the rights of laborers and
materialmen to recovery of the fund has been rejected in some jurisdictions on
the same ground on which the Government interest as a basis for the surety's
derivative rights was repudiated. The absence of the Government's legal ob-
ligation and its immunity from liens on its property implied that the gratuitous
bond protection afforded laborers and materialmen by Congress constituted the
sole and exclusive remedy and measure of their rights. 42 Further, the addi-
tional protection granted by recognition of equitable rights of the suppliers in
the fund was presumed to be unnecessary and inconsistent with the very exist-
ence of the payment bond which supposedly provided full protection.43 But in
some cases, as where the surety as well as the contractor was bankrupt 44 or
where the surety had paid claims up to the penal sum of the bond leaving some
72 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 583 (1934) ; In re P. McGarry & Son,
240 Fed. 400 (7th Cir. 1917).
For a state bond case in accord, see It re Heintzelman Constr. Co., 34 F. Supp. 109
(W.D.N.Y. 1940); but see In re H. A. Moore Co., 31 F.2d 321 (M.D. Pa. 1929).
39. See American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
40. American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank, supra note 39; United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935) ; National Sur. Co. v. United States,
133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
For state bond cases in accord, see Street v. Pacific Indem. Co., 79 F.2d 68 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 297 U.S. 718 (1935) ; Seaboard Sur. Co. v. North Dakota, 94 F. Supp. 177
(D.N.D. 1950) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. John R. Alley & Co., 34 F. Supp. 604
(W.D. Okla. 1940).
41. E.g., In re P. McGarry & Son, 240 Fed. 400 (7th Cir. 1917). For state bond cases
in accord, see United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. John R. Alley & Co., supra note 40; Street
v. Pacific Indem. Co., supra note 40.
Concerning the superior claim of laborers and materialmen in bankruptcy, see Kreimer
v. Second Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Pa. Super. 644, 176 A.2d 132 (1961) ; In re Heint-
zelman Constr. Co., 34 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); but see In re L. H. Duncan &
Sons, 46 F. Supp. 825 (W.D. Pa. 1941).
42. Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1955) ; In re Flotation
Systems, 65 F. Supp. 698, 701-02 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
43. In re Flotation Systems, supra note 42, at 702:
No principle warrants our creating an equitable lien in their favor as against general
creditors zeho do not have the additional protection of the bond.
Indeed, such courts note that the very purpose of the Miller Act payment bond was to
shift the ultimate risk of loss from workmen and suppliers to the surety. American Sur.
Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958).
44. E.g., Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937) ; Philadelphia Nat'l Bank
v. McKinlay, 72 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 583 (1934) ; Hadden v. United
States, 132 Ct. Cl. 529 (1955). The Supreme Court in United States v. Munsey Trust Co.,
332 U.S. 234, 242 (1947), expressly reserved decision on this situation.
1282 [Vol. 71 :1274
MILLER ACT PAYMENT BOND
claimants unpaid,45 courts have recognized that the bond is inadequate protec-
tion and have allowed these claimants access to the fund, which suggests that
suppliers clearly have rights other than those afforded by the bond. Such addi-
tional rights, moreover, need not be considered inconsistent with the existence
of the bond, since the statutory bond does not necessarily discharge all the
underlying equities, the recognition of which forms the basis of the enactment
of the Miller Act.40 Indeed, such legislation has been construed as a "precursor
of judicial recognition of an enforceable equitable right of unpaid furnishers
of labor or materials" to funds held by the Government subsequent to comple-
tion of construction.47 In any case, the statutory bond enactment need not
imply any legislative policy decision as to the respective rights of the surety
and third parties; on the contrary, absent any indication of preference, the pre-
sumption would seem in favor of providing the surety with rights to the fund
in the public field analogous to those established through commercial law prin-
ciples applicable to private contracts.
48
The confusion in this area was heightened by sundry interpretations of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Munsey Trust Co.49 The Court,
reversing the holding of the Court of Claims which awarded the retainages to
a receiver for the benefit of a surety who had paid laborers and materialmen,
firmly established the principle that the Government, possessing withheld funds,
is the best secured of all creditors and may apply such moneys in "set-off"
against any debts, from whatever source, owed it by the contractor10 But this
45. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133 (1935).
Even where the suppliers went unpaid because of their own failure to bring an action
against the surety within the statutory period, the surety is not entitled to share in the
assets of the bankrupt's estate until all members of the class covered by the bonds are paid.
American Sur. Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269 (1946). See SImpsoN, SURETYs IP 213-14
(1950).
46. Recognizing the existence of equitable rights of laborers and materialmen to be
paid, the provision of a bond merely constitutes a vehicle for the securing of such rights.
For example, the rights of laborers and materialmen in the private field continue to exist
regardless of the bond, each supplementing the other. See notes 1-5 supra and accompany-
ing text; Martin v. National Sur. Co., 85 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1936) ; American Sur. Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 296 U.S. 133 (1935) ;
Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144, 149 (6th Cir.
1921).
47. American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.),
aff'd, 296 U.S. 133 (1935).
48. Concerning the feeling of some courts, notably the Court of Claims, that the rules
of private commercial law should be maintained under federal contracts, see NATIONAL
LAW CENTER OF GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE
ON UNITED STATES GOVERNMAENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, Nov. 6 & 7, 1961, at p. 39
(reference was made to the Assignment of Claims Act and the absence of congressional
intent to change the rules of private commercial law).
49. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
50. Id. at 239, where the Court said, quoting Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) 336, 370 (1841):
The government has the same right "which belongs to every creditor, to apply the
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"set-off" situation must be distinguished from cases where the Government is
a mere "stakeholder," for in the latter no claim is lodged against the United
States 51 and the subrogation-destroying-superior-equity which the Govern-
ment asserts in the former is not present.5 2 Thus, it is essential to a proper
construction of the Munsey opinion to recognize its peculiar application to
cases in which the surety is in actual conflict with the direct interests of the
Government as a creditor in its own right.
53
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in American Sur. Co. v. Hinds,
5 4
where a Miller Act payment bond surety was denied any subrogative rights to
retained funds which had been disbursed to the defaulting contractor's trustee
in bankruptcy, failed to appreciate this distinction.5 i Following language in
Munsey, the court observed that since laborers and materialmen have no en-
forceable rights against the Government, the surety derived no advantage by
subrogation to their rights.5 6 But the fact that suppliers have no legally en-
unappropriated moneys of his debtor, in his hands, in extinguishment of the debts
due to him."
51. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. The apparent concern of the Court in
Munsey was that the underwriter of a bond, which the United States had gratuitously
provided for the protection of laborers and materialmen, was asserting rights arising under
the bond to the detriment of the United States. The Court felt that this would allow the
surety to increase the risks of the Government and concluded that such a result could not
be permitted. 332 U.S. at 244.
An earlier example of this attitude can be found in Lawrence v. United States, 71 Fed.
228, 230 (D.S.C. 1896) :
[T]hese laborers and material men have no rights, as against the government,-
rights which can be enforced .... They are recipients of its bounty, debtors to its
good will, objects of its provident care, in whose favor ... it exercises its right and
privilege to withhold the money until their claims are satisfied. Nor have they any
specific interest in the money so withheld.
52. The usual concept of subrogation requires an absence of outstanding and superior
equities, upon which the substitution of a subrogee into the shoes of its creditor is con-
ditioned. See Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Conn. 232, 238-40,
193 Atl. 769, 772 (1937). Where, as in Mut;sey, the Government is asserting a right of
set-off against claims which ultimately are founded on its recognition of equitable rights,
the condition of subrogation is not present.
53. The Munsey Court itself stated that:
[W]e have recognized the peculiarly equitable claim of those responsible for the
physical completion of building contracts to be paid from available moneys ahead of
others whose claims come from the advance of money. But in all those cases, the
owner was a mere stakeholder and had no rights of its own to assert.
332 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added). See Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891
(Ct. Cl. 1950), as to the distinguishability of Munsey and other cases from "stakeholder"
suits.
54. 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958).
55. Id. at 368.
56. Ibid. See Bowden v. United States, 239 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 957 (1957) ; Bank of Arizona v. National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956);
Phoenix Idem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955).
For state bond cases in accord, see City of Philadelphia v. National Sur. Corp., 140
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forceable rights against the Government for their compensation is pertinent
only where the Government is itself claiming the fund, for, in that case, the
concept of equitable rights, discretionarily derived from the Government, is
meaningless; it does not, however, argue against the presence of equitable
rights in the absence of the Government's claim. The opinion in Munsey,
nevertheless, seemed to suggest that even in the latter case suppliers would
have no claim. In an unusual display of paralogism, Mr. Justice Jackson ob-
served that, even if it be posited that suppliers had an equitable lien on the
fund and that the Government would therefore be justified in refusing to dis-
burse the fund to the contractor, they could not have a lien upon moneys which
the United States might "legally keep," for laborers and materialmen may not
claim moneys not due the contractor.5 7 But the Government may "legally keep"
the fund because of the equitable lien of suppliers. This argument, moreover,
assumes that the suppliers' sole claim is through the rights of the contractor
which, in addition to being contrary to the weight of previous authority,c5 begs
the very question at issue.59
Quoting at length from Munsey, the Hinds court denied the existence of any
equitable lien of laborers and materialmen on the fund to which the surety
might be subrogated on the further ground that, "more likely," the only motive
of the Government for retaining the percentages was to secure timely per-
formance, rather than to assure the payment of laborers and materialmen. 60
Were this the case, the fund would be unconditionally payable upon satisfac-
F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1944) ; State Bank v. Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 416,
212 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1961); Farmers State Bank v. Burns, 212 Minn. 455, 4 N.W.2d 330
(1942). Cf. In re L. H. Duncan & Sons, 46 F. Supp. 825 (W.D. Pa. 1941), where the
surety was allowed priority to wage claims, but not to material claims, under Pennsylvania
law.
57. 332 U.S. at 241-42.
58. See notes 32, 34. 37, & 38 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Note, 20 U. CiNc. L. REv. 494, 498 (1951). The Court noted that, in any
event, the surety has paid laborers and materialmen and the Government is therefore free
to disburse the fund unconditionally since the equities of the suppliers have been discharged.
The surety, in order to rely on these rights, must establish that such rights existed before
payment of suppliers' claims. 332 U.S. at 242.
If before they are paid, the fund to which they are said to be entitled to look is un-
available for the very reason that they are unpaid, the surety relies on nothing when
it relies on those nonexistent "rights."
Ibid. This statement in Mimsey on subrogation and the manner in which it arises would,
if followed, negative subrogation in all cases, since, as the Court itself noted, the substitu-
tion which subrogation contemplates places the subrogee in the position of the creditor paid
as if the debt had not been paid. Ibid. See Lumpkin v. Mills, 4 Ga. 343, 345, 348-49 (1848);
cf. Patton's Executor v. Smith, 130 Ky. 819, 114 S.W. 315 (1908).
60. 260 F.2d at 368, quoting United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 243
(1947):
[A]Ithough we have assumed... that assurance that laborers and materialmen will
be paid is one of the reasons for retaining the money, it seems more likely that com-
pletion of the work is the only motive .... It is hardly reasonable to withhold
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tory completion, title would vest in the trustee,61 and the laborers and material-
men could have no equitable lien on the fund.62 Such language in Munsey, how-
ever, was intended to preclude the possibility of the surety asserting a claim
superior to the Government's claim of set-off, for, were the Government legally
obligated to retain the fund as security for the payment of laborers and ma-
terialmen, diversion of the fund by the Government, the obligee, would violate
the rule that an obligee, as against a surety, may not apply security in satis-
faction of a debt other than the one it secured. 3 But the lack of legal obligation
to withhold the fund for the benefit of laborers and materialmen does not
negative the possibility that the Government might have discretionary author-
ity to retain the moneys for this purpose. In fact, where a surety has satisfied
the claims of suppliers, many courts have held that the funds are not un-
conditionally payable to the contractor upon satisfactory performance. 4 The
standard federal construction contract itself implies the existence of such dis-
money in order to assure payments which perhaps can be made only from the
moneys earned.
See also Schmoll v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 753 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 724
(1946) ; Farmers State Bank v. Burns, 212 Minn. 455, 4 N.W.2d 330, 334 (1942). Yet in
the private field, the existence of the above practical consideration does not preclude re-
tention subsequent to completion. See GEE 150-51.
61. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6) (1959), 53 Stat. 880 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110a(6) (1958).
62. See Schmoll v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 753 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 724
(1946). Munsey suggested that the contractor might compel payment of the fund upon
satisfactory completion. 332 U.S. at 241 n.4. It is true that under the standard federal con-
struction contract, the amount due the contractor becomes payable upon completion and
acceptance of all work, and, if required, after the contractor has furnished the Government
with a release of all claims against the Government arising under and by virtue of the
contract, other than such claims as may be specifically excepted from operation of the
release. Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs. § 54.13, Art. 16(d) (1958),
and Standard Form No. 23A, Art. 7(e), 26 Fed. Reg. 1050 (1961). These discretionary
payment provisions do give the contracting officer great leeway, even in the face of out-
standing claims against the contractor and the United States.
For state bond cases considering the fund unconditionally payable, see State Bank v.
Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 23 Misc. 2d 487, 199 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 12
App. Div. 2d 416, 212 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1961).
63. 332 U.S. at 243 and cases cited therein. One court, apparently ignoring this rule
and basing its decision on the dictum of Munsey, considered the Government's right of set-
off superior to the claim of a surety completing performance under obligation of a Miller
Act performance bond. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 829 (Ct. CI.
1951). Such reasoning is clearly erroneous in light of (1) the express declaration of Mun-
sey granting the surety superiority where there exists a sound basis of subrogation, (2)
the accepted principle of equitable subrogation to the rights of the Government where the
surety has benefited the Government by assuming the contractor's duty to pay damages,
Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896) ; Hardin County Say. Bank v.
United States, 65 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1946), and (3) Munsey's explicit recognition of
the rule regarding diversion of security, 332 U.S. at 243.
64. The lien has been afforded to the payment bond surety where the contract explicitly
provided for such retention, Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Federal Nat'l Bank, 112 F.2d 692
(10th Cir. 1940) (state bond) ; It re Cummins Constr. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 193 (D. Aid.
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cretionary power. 65 And, notwithstanding dictum in Munsey to the contrary,66
it is clear that the Government, in practice, does not consider the fund uncon-
ditionally payable.
67
1948) ; where the contract was silent as to the purpose of the retainages, National Sur.
Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381, 384 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; and where the Government
was legally bound only to retain the fund until performance, California Bank v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1942). The fund might be considered out
of reach of the contractor-principal on a number of grounds that have arisen in the private
and public-state and federal-construction contract cases: (1) The contractor has no
property interest in the fund until payment of suppliers. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. New
York Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957) (no conditional right to the fund
under state law which controls); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. McKinlay, 72 F.2d 89 (D.C.
Cir. 1934) (bankrupt has no title) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge
Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947) (state bond). (2) The contractor's failure
to comply with the contractual duty to pay laborers and materialmen, not justified by the
conduct of the owner, discharges the latter's duty to give the contractor the withheld funds.
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 183 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (private
contract) ; Steelcraft Mfg. Co. v. Hewkin, 148 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ill. 1956) ; United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.N.C. 1956). (3) The equitable lien of
the surety on the fund is an encumbrance which the principal cannot avoid, Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank v. McKinlay, supra, nor can the Government decide the merits of competing
claims by delivering the stake to one. Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 955
(Ct. Cl. 1959).
65. Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs. § 54.13, Art. 16(b) (1958),
the standard federal construction contract, provides for retention of ten percent of all
monthly partial payments made during the progress of work subject to any later modifi-
cations authorized under Art. 16(b). Upon satisfactory completion the retainage and any
unpaid contract balance becomes due and payable under Art. 16(d). However, upon pres-
entation of the properly executed and certified voucher of completion, the Government may
require the contractor to furnish a release of all claims against the Government arising
under the contract, thus providing one source of authority for maintaining possession of
the fund subsequent to completion. Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs.
§ 54.13, Art. 16(d) (1958), and Standard Form No. 23A, Art. 7(e), 26 Fed. Reg. 1050
(1961). In addition, 41 U.S.C. § 54.13, Art. 17(a) (App. 1958), provides that the con-
tracting officer may withhold accrued payments to the extent necessary to ensure payment
to laborers and mechanics of the difference between the rate of wages required by contract
and the rate of wages actually received by them. Though the provision literally authorizes
such only where the rate of pay has been lowered below the specified minimum federal
standard, a prudent disbursing officer presumably would be empowered to protect work-
men from the greater included "offense"-nonpayment. It should be noted that the new
contract form, effective July 1, 1961, is totally silent as to the above. See Standard Form
No. 23A, 26 Fed. Reg. 1050 (1961). See Note, 20 U. CiNc. L. Rxv. 494, 495 (1951);
Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under Federal Construction Contracts: Payment Bond
Surety vs. Assignee, 47 VA. L. REv. 640, 643 n.12 (1961), as to the authority of the dis-
bursing officer to maintain control of withheld funds subsequent to completion.
66. 332 U.S. at 241 n.4.
67. The Government, when unable to obtain a release of labor and material claims
from the contractor, can exercise its discretion under Articles 16(d) and 17(a) of the
contract, supra note 65. Or where it has been put on notice of various claims, the Govern-
ment usually will not attempt to decide the merits of the claims or put itself in jeopardy
of multiple losses, but will interplead the interested parties when appropriate. See Newark
Ins. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. United
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On the basis of the mistaken assumption that the fund is unconditionally
payable, the Hinds court summarily denied any subrogative right of the surety
to the fund through the Government. 68 In so doing, the court noted some re-
cent indistinguishable cases which implicitly recognized such authority and
which were contrary to its holding,69 but denied the validity of such cases be-
cause of their reliance on earlier ones in which the competing claimants were
assignee banks. This situation, the court believed, was distinguishable from the
present case, where the claimant was the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy."°
But it is clear that the surety's rights to the retainages, as determined by prin-
ciples of subrogation, are not dependent upon the identity of the third party
claimant. 71 If the trustee could utilize his statutory powers of avoidance in the
face of the surety's subrogative rights, he would be entitled to the withheld
funds. But the trustee's statutory powers do not deny the existence of sub-
rogative rights, but only may potentially avoid such rights that are, in fact,
established. Since the equitable lien or priority of the surety "relates-back" to
the date of the bond as a matter of law,72 however, these liens, constituting
charges or encumberances on property,73 will be valid in all cases where bank-
ruptcy has ensued four or more months subsequent to execution of the bond 
74
States, 169 F. Supp. 945, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1959). Similarly, when it has a claim of its own to
set-off, the United States must hold "the unappropriated moneys of his debtor in his hands,"
necessitating retention of the fund subsequent to acceptance of the work. United States v.
Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947), quoting from Gratiot v. United States, 40
U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 370 (1841).
68. 260 F.2d at 368.
69. Ibid. The cases contra are, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp.
381 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950) ;
In re Cummins Constr. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1948) ; United, States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947).
70. 260 F.2d at 368.
71. Cf. In re Scofield Co., 215 Fed. 45 (2d Cir. 1914).
72. See Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1960); United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Glenn v.
American Sur. Co., 160 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas
Co. v. Lehman-Hoge & Scott, 122 F. Supp. 314, 319 (N.D. Ala. 1954); American Fid.
Co. v. Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702, 710 (D. Vt. 1953) ; In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711,
712-13 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
Several cases suggest that the equitable lien thus acquired is independent of and con-
sistent with rights under the assignment or under any form of subrogation. See, e.g.,
Colusa-Glenn Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 145 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Lehman-Hoge & Scott, supra at 318-19.
73. E.g., Tobin v. Insurance Agency Co., 80 F.2d 241, 243 (8th Cir. 1935).
74. Even where the lien is deemed to arise within. four months of bankruptcy, it may
still serve to prevent an unjustified "windfall" to general creditors who never had any in-
terest in the contract funds without constituting a preference. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Grand
Ave. State Bank, 223 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1955), noted with approval in 34 TEX. L. REv.
758 (1956).
Further, the Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a) (6), 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (6)
(1958), does not declare the policy of the Act to be against the recognition of all equitable
liens, but only against those "where available means of perfecting legal liens have not been
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and will thus entitle the surety to priority in payment from the fund over gen-
eral creditors,75 subsequent lienholders,76 and the trustee in bankruptcy,77 not-
withstanding his powers of avoidance.
Arguably, the Hinds court may have ignored the possibility of the surety
having subrogative rights through the United States because of the subroga-
tion provision of the Bankruptcy Act 78 which seems to limit subrogative rights
of the surety to those of the creditor paid-the laborers and materialmen.70
But, under settled principles of the law of bankruptcy, where the creditor has
been paid in full before adjudication, the surety may elect to assert a claim in
its own right,80 which claim has its source in the equitable lien derived from
the Government's authority to withhold funds for the surety's benefit.
The court in Hinds might have attempted to distinguish the situation before
it from those, as in Henningsen, where the Government continued to act as
"stakeholder," on the ground that in this case the Government, by disburse-
employed." Danais v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (D.N.H. 1952), read
with approval in Comment, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 541 (1955) ; Note, 17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 712
(1956). The whole of subsection (6) of the Act has application only where a legal lien
can be acquired through court action. 102 F. Supp. at 877. See also Cumberland Portland
Cement Co. v. RFC., 140 F. Supp. 739, 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1953). Under this section, the
equitable lien will not be recognized and will constitute a preference only if all other ele-
ments of a preference are present and if it is not perfected. Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748
(10th Cir. 1955). See Weintraub & Levin, The Equitable Lien, 30 REF. J. 92 (1956). Since
there exists no method by which the lien may be perfected while the fund is in the hands
of a "stakeholder," Cumberland Portland Cement Co. v. RFC., supra; Pacific Indem. Co.
v. Grand Ave. State Bank, supra; Danais v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., supra, and creditors
may have actual or constructive knowledge of the surety's rights, e.g., National Sur. Corp.
v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 891, 894 (Ct. Cf. 1950), many courts have excluded the equitable lien of the sure-
ty from operation of the preference provision of the Act.
75. E.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958);
London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Endres, 290 Fed. 98 (8th Cir. 1923) ; Cox v. New
England Equit. Ins. Co., 247 Fed. 955 (8th Cir. 1917) ; Cumberland Portland Cement Co.
v. RFC, 140 F. Supp. 739, 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
76. Royal Indem. Co. v. Board of Educ., 137 F. Supp. 890, 892 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
77. E.g., Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. McKinlay, 72 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 583 (1934) ; In re Cummins Constr. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1948).
78. Bankruptcy Act § 57(i), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(i) (1958).
79. The Bankruptcy Act provides that a surety, upon proving the claim of the creditor
against the bankrupt estate and showing that he has secured the debt, may be subrogated
to the extent of the creditor's rights whether the surety paid the creditor before or after
adjudication in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 57(i), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(i)
(1958). See also Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Fitzgerald, 272 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) ; Allen v. See, 196 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1952).
The Hinds court, citing with approval Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th
Cir. 1955), may have adopted the latter's construction of § 57(i), limiting the surety to
the position of the laborers and materialmen paid, and thereby, under both the Earle and
Hinds interpretations of Munsey, relegated the surety to the status of a general creditor.
See also City of Philadelphia v. National Sur. Corp., 140 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1944), limiting
the surety's subrogative rights to those of materialmen, under Pennsylvania law.
80. See MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 145, at 138 (1956).
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ment of the fund, had chosen not to meet its "equitable obligation," nor to
exercise its discretionary rights to withhold the fund, and had therefore erased
any equities which the surety might otherwise assert through the Govern-
ment.81 But if the surety from whatever source is possessed of an equitable
lien on the fund, the prevailing view is that the Government, by unilateral
action, cannot discharge these equities to the detriment of the lienholder.8 - The
surety's lien, not resting on the actual exercise of the Government's discretion
but rather on its mere potential right to withhold such funds, is impressed
upon the fund and is defeasible only upon payment of it to a bona fide creditor
of the contractor taking without notice of the surety's rights.8 3 Consequently,
though the surety's strongest claim may be proffered where the Government
has continued to be a "stakeholder," 4 the mere fact of disbursement is not
determinative of the surety's rights.
81. See American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Bank of Arizona v. National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Cox v. New Eng-
land Equit. Ins. Co., 247 Fed. 955 (8th Cir. 1917).
82. E.g., In re P. McGarry & Son, 240 Fed. 400 (7th Cir. 1917). Recently, the Court
of Claims, in Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1959), held that
a stakeholder (the United States) as between two competing claimants could not in effect
decide the merits of their claims by delivery of the stake to one of them.
If it is made to appear that the Government's officials, after due notice of facts giv-
ing rise to an equitable right in the plaintiff surety company, and of the plaintiff's
assertion of such a right, paid out ... the money in question to someone other than
the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be entitled to a judgment.
Id. at 957. The award was made to the surety, even though there was no stake and the
Government was out of pocket.
83. When the surety assumed the obligations of suretyship,
its equity at once commenced with its obligation to see that .. . [the contractor]
performed all the obligations which the contract with the government imposed upon
it, including its obligations to promptly pay the laborers and materialmen.
It re Scofield Co., 215 Fed. 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1914). It effects a continuing priority to pay-
ment from the fund. Belknap Hardware Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144,
148-49 (6th Cir. 1921). Thus where the fund is in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy, who
is vested with title to all property of the bankrupt as of the date of adjudication, e.g.,
American Sur. Co. v. Owens, 66 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v.
McKinlay, 72 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ; Bankruptcy Act § 70e, 52 Stat. 880 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 110a, the fund stands charged with the same equities the surety possessed when
the fund was undistributed in the hands of the United States. United States v. Fogerty, 164
F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir.
1935) ; In re P. McGarry & Sons, supra note 82.
Similarly, if the fund is disbursed to an assignee bank, it is impressed with the surety's
equities. E.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 156 Me. 87, 161
A.2d 843 (1960) ; Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
However, the fund sought by the surety must be traceable to the disbursed retainages.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958) ("clearly
traceable") ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, supra; In re Supreme Appliance
& Heating Co., 113 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
84. In the status of the Government, the surety might assume the retainages withheld
under the contract, Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs. § 54.13, Arts.
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The inadequacies of the Hinds approach were recognized in In re Dutcher
Constr. Corp., a case factually indistinguishable from Hinds, in which the
district court relied on Henningsen to hold in favor of the surety's claim to
"stakeholder" funds in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy."6 But even the
Dutcher court felt constrained to examine and distinguish the confusing anal-
ysis of rights and obligations in Munsey.8 7 Indeed, it is not at all clear whether
this court found for the surety on the basis of its subrogation to the equitable
rights of laborers and materialmen in the fund or on the basis of the surety's
satisfaction of the "equitable obligation" owed by the Government to assure
payment of suppliers. But the foregoing analysis indicates that a failure to
carefully distinguish the source of the surety's rights to the fund can have un-
fortunate results. Denying the existence of an "equitable lien" of laborers and
materialmen on the fund, an equitable right which may appear to be the corre-
lative of the Henningsen "equitable obligation," can cause a court, as in Hinds,
to assume that the absence of rights derived from laborers and materialmen
precludes the existence of any other subrogative rights of the surety.,8 And
considering the confused mixture of principles of both reimbursement and sub-
rogation present in the Henningsen theory, it is not surprising that the surety's
right to the fund through the Government has also been often denied.
Many of the conceptual difficulties raised by the use of the "equitable lien" -
"equitable obligation" doctrines are avoided in Continental Cas. Co. v. United
States.9 In that case, as in Henningsen, the United States had maintained
possession of the retainages and unpaid contract balance as "stakeholder" until
the conflicting claims of the surety and the trustee in bankruptcy were re-
solved.9 0 The Court of Claims proposed a single question as outcome deter-
minative-was the surety satisfying an obligation of the contractor to the
United States ?91 Answering in the affirmative, the court stated that though the
Government did not promise to pay laborers and materialmen and the law did
not give them a lien against federal structures in the event of nonpayment, the
United States was not willing that they should go unpaid, and thus required of
the contractor, as a condition for the award of the contract, a payment bond
for the protection of suppliers.9 2 Based upon this requirement and the Govern-
16(d) & 17(a) (1958) ; set-off the amount owing the contractor against the damages aris-
ing on default, in accord with United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947) ;
claim the Government's statutory priority under the Bankruptcy Act, see MAcLAcHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY § 145, at 138-39 (1956) ; and, finally, assert rights under its own equitable lien
or equitable priority.
85. 197 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
86. Id. at 442-43.
87. Ibid.
88. See text at notes 68-77 supra.
89. 169 F. Supp. 945 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
90. Id. at 946. The United States brought in the trustee in bankruptcy through a
motion for intervention.
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 946-47.
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ment's standard contractual provision obligating the contractor to pay laborers
and materialmen, 93 the United States acquired a right against the contractor to
ensure such payment.9 4 Therefore, upon payment, the surety satisfied the two-
fold obligations of the contractor: first, to the laborers and materialmen who,
the court made clear, are mere general creditors ;95 and second, to the United
States, which is a preferred creditor because of its possession of funds that
may be set-off against the amount due the defaulting contractor. 6 Consequent-
ly, the surety, as a subrogee of the Government, recovered the fund to the
extent of loss under the bond.
Continental's statement of the surety's subrogation to the rights of the Gov-
ernment is unique. For it, unlike other statements, establishes a clear doctrinal
foundation for the rights of a surety in the field of public construction con-
tracts. This court's theory constructs a quadrangle of rights and liabilities
which rests on a duty impressed by the Government upon the contractor to
secure the payment of laborers and materialmen through the furnishing of a
payment bond and contractually covenanting to pay them.97 The Government
can ensure the contractor's fulfillment of this obligation by retention of the
fund as security, the contractor having mutually agreed with the Government
that such payment would be accomplished. Upon payment, therefore, the sure-
ty benefits not only the suppliers, but also the Government as contractee, and
is subrogated to the latter's right to utilize the fund to offset the damages aris-
ing upon default.9 8 Moreover, since the surety's right relates-back to the com-
93. Standard Form No. 23, 41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs. § 54.13, Art. 17(a) (1958).
But see note 97 infra as to the new standard contract.
94. 169 F. Supp. at 947.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. The new Government construction contract, effective July 1, 1961, is silent as to
the obligation of the contractor to pay laborers and materialmen. See Standard Form No.
23A, 26 Fed. Reg. 1050 (1961). The Miller Act Payment Bond continues to contain a pro-
vision that "the principal shall promptly make payment to all persons supplying labor and
materials." See the United States form approved Sept. 16, 1935, Standard Form No. 25A,
41 U.S.C. App., Rules & Regs. § 54.16 (1958). This bond covenant has been read into the
prime contract by several courts so that breach of the bond is an effective breach of the
contract with the United States. Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588, 598 (1937).
See Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 436, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1944), where the
court said:
[W]hen the surety pays the laborers and materialmen, it is performing the contract
as much as when it completes the building.
See also Morgenthau v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 94 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1937). Conse-
quently, even in the absence of a direct contractual duty toward the Government, the surety
still satisfies an obligation, contractual in nature, owed by the contractor to the United
States.
98. Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957) ; In re L. H. Duncan & Sons, 127 F.2d
640 (3d Cir. 1942) (failure to pay tantamount to breach of contract). Subrogation arises
from the owner's right to have the original contract performed according to its terms, one
of which is the direct contractual obligation to the Government, as contractee, binding the
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mencement of its obligation, the date of the bond, the surety's claim attaches
to the fund in the form of an equitable lien that is defeasible only upon trans-
fer of the fund to a bona fide creditor of the contractor taking without knowl-
edge of its rights.99 Though this theory, incorporating the idea of an equitable
lien, may seem the other side of the Henningsen coin, it is not similar. The
interest of the Government as contractee is based on the same underlying equi-
table consideration which prevented the Government from leaving suppliers
unsecured because of the happenstance of Government immunity from liens
and the absence of direct contractual liability of the United States. But the
Government's right to which the surety is subrogated is not the amorphous
equitable one espoused in Henningsen; rather it arises from the provisions of
the contract between the Government and the contractor. Under this theory
the Government is solely an obligee, 1°0 thus resolving the inconsistency of the
Henningsen duality. Further, the disturbing absence of the Government's pri-
mary liability, evident in the Henningsen theory, is no longer of any conse-
quence, for the Government is the beneficiary, rather than the obligor, of the
contractual duty.
contractor and the surety to pay suppliers. Failure to meet this term constitutes a breach
of contract upon which the Government, as owner-promisee in this donee beneficiary con-
tract, and its subrogee become entitled to the withheld fund to the extent of loss. Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 183 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Pa. 1960) ; Sundheim v. School
Dist. of Philadelphia, 311 Pa. 90, 166 Atl. 365 (1933).
99. Cf., Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N.Y. 162, 158 N.E. 60 (1927), merging
wrongful release of a tortfeasor by an insured, characterized in PATrERSON, MANUAL FOR
TEACHERS, CASES ON INSURANCE 22 (3d ed. 1955) as an "equitable tort." As to the "equit-
able lien," similar only in result to the one formerly discussed, see note 82 supra and ac-
companying text.
100. Notwithstanding the statement in Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River
Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1921), that the Government's designation as
obligee of the bond is solely for the convenience of claimants, the force of this "mere"
designation becomes apparent. The Government, under the Continental theory by opera-
tion of law becomes a true obligee, rather than a mere formal one. See United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947).
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